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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mr. Olson appeals the district court's decision to summarily dismiss his post-
conviction petition. Mr. Olson contends that the district court erred by not granting 
his requested continuance of the June 15, 2012, summary disposition hearing, thereby 
depriving him of effective assistance of counsel. He also contends that, based on the 
district court's and counsel's representations concerning what they wanted to do at that 
hearing, as well as the procedures employed, the June 15, 2012, hearing was only a 
summary disposition hearing. Finally, he asserts that the district court improperly 
summarily denied several of his claims at that time. 
The State responds, contending that counsel had sufficient time to prepare and 
was, in fact, prepared. That argument is meritless, as it ignores the context and facts 
surrounding counsel's statements in that regard. All counsel told the district court was 
that he was prepared to allow Mr. Olson to try and justify his allegations, but that was 
not what he had been appointed to do. Counsel's statements, as well as his intentions 
for the June 15, 2012, hearing reveal that he was not prepared to effectively assist 
Mr. Olsen in defending his allegations against summary judgment. He certainly was not 
prepared to proceed if the hearing were, as the State believes, a full evidentiary 
hearing. 
The State's argument that the June 15, 2012, hearing was a full evidentiary 
hearing relies primarily on the scheduling orders. That argument impermissibly 
promotes form over substance. It also ignores the assertions by both the district court 
and defense counsel as to what they intended to do at the June 15, 2012, hearing. In 
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fact, if the State were correct, then Mr. Olson would have been deprived of his due 
process rights to notice and a full, fair, and meaningful opportunity to be heard. 
Additionally, if it were an evidentiary hearing, Mr. Olson should have been afforded 
post-conviction relief. He presented evidence in support of his claims and the State 
offered nothing to weigh against that evidence. As such, a preponderance of the 
evidence shows that Mr. Olson proved his claims. Therefore, because the district court 
erred by summarily dismissing claims presenting genuine issues of material fact, this 
Court should remand the case for further proceedings, to be held after Mr. Olson is 
given sufficient time to prepare for those proceedings. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Olson's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
2 
ISSUES 
1. Whether the district court erred by not affording Mr. Olson sufficient time to 
discuss his potential claims with post-conviction counsel so that he might develop 
them into viable post-conviction claims, which was the point of the Court of 
Appeals' decision to remand this case following the initial, inappropriate summary 
dismissal of those claims. 
2. Whether the district court erroneously summarily dismissed Mr. Olson's petition 
for post-conviction relief in the face of at least one genuine issue of material fact. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Erred By Not Affording Mr. Olson Sufficient Time To Discuss 
His Potential Claims With Post-Conviction Counsel So That He Might Develop 
Them Into Viable Post-Conviction Claims, Which Was The Point Of The Court Of 
Appeals' Decision To Remand This Case Following The Initial, Inappropriate 
Summary Dismissal Of Those Claims 
The State misunderstands Mr. Olson's argument that he was not afforded 
sufficient time to prepare for the June 15, 2012, hearing. He is not arguing for a 
conclusion that, as a matter of law, forty-three days is insufficient time to prepare for a 
hearing. (See Resp. Br., p.8.) Rather, Mr. Olson is arguing that the continuance should 
have been granted because the unique facts of this case demonstrate that counsel was 
unprepared to proceed on June 15, 2012. (See App. Br., pp.8-14.) The effect of forcing 
Mr. Olson to proceed when his counsel was clearly unable to assist him deprived 
Mr. Olson of his right to effective assistance of counsel. 
The record reveals that counsel was unable to offer Mr. Olson effective 
assistance in presenting his claims to the district court. Relying on counsel's assertion 
that he had already evaluated the claims not resolved by the decision in Olson v. State, 
2012 Unpublished Opinion No.398, pp.5-6, 9 (Ct. App. 2012) (hereinafter, Olson//), the 
State contends that post-conviction counsel was ready to proceed on the remaining 
claims. (See Resp. Br., p.7 (citing Tr., Vol.4, p.27, L.16 - p.28, L.18).) However, 
counsel's assertions indicate nothing of the sort. Counsel informed the district court: 
I'm telling the Court that I have investigated this case before and filed a 
second amended petition, which I believe had merit, and that case was 
fully litigated. So I'm in a position here where I'm trying to do, basically, 
follow the mandates of the Appellate Court and this Court in terms of 
telling the Court what the claims are. But if you're asking me whether I've 
conducted an investigation of claims and believe that the claims have 
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merit, that's a different matter, and I can't really comment on that, other 
than to say that I have -- I have tried to proceed professional by providing 
the appropriate pleadings before, which are not at issue today before the 
Court. So that's where I'm at professionally. I feel like I'm kind of being 
bound here in the record into asserting things -- half of the merit of my 
client [sic] -- when that's not what I've been directed to do. So to the 
extent that I can provide assistance to the Court in elucidating what it is he 
wants to testify or assert here, I'm happy to do that. 
(Tr., Vol.4, p.27, L.20 - p.28, L.18 (emphasis added).) The entirety of post-conviction 
counsel's comments actually undermines the State's argument that he had investigated 
the still-pending allegations and was ready to proceed. 
Besides ignoring the context of counsel's statements, the State's contention -
that counsel had previously reviewed those claims and was sufficiently prepared to 
pursue them (Resp. Br., pp.6-7) - also ignores the procedural history of this case. For 
example, counsel specifically asserted that his original efforts on the case were directed 
at the matters identified in the second amended petition. (Tr., Vol.4, p.27, L.21 - p.28, 
L9; compare R., Vol.1, pp.5-19 (the original petition and affidavit in support) with 
R., Vol.1, pp.100-104 (the second amended petition filed by post-conviction counsel).) 
As post-conviction counsel pointed out, none of the issues presented in the second 
amended petition remained before the district court on remand, as they had been 
resolved in Olson II. (Tr., Vol.4, p.28, Ls.3-10.) It is, of course, necessary to remember 
why this case was remanded in the first place: the district court had improperly 
summarily dismissed the claims that were not addressed in the second amended 
petition before appointing counsel to represent Mr. Olson. Olson II, 2012 Unpublished 
Opinion No.398, pp.5-6, 9. As such, post-conviction counsel would have had no reason 
to fully investigate those claims, as the district court had already dismissed them by the 
time he was appointed to represent Mr. Olson. 
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In fact, post-conviction counsel told the district court, in regard to the claims still 
pending, all he was ready to do on June 15, 2012, was "provide assistance to the Court 
in elucidating what it is [Mr. Olson] wants to testify or assert here .... " (Tr., Vol.4, p.28, 
Ls.15-17; see also Tr., Vol.4, p.11, Ls.19-22 ("My intention would be to put Mr. Olson on 
the stand and have him go through basically the original petition . . . have him go 
through each one of the claims that he set forth.").) The State counters, relying on 
counsel's assertion that he "was ready to proceed," again without discussing the context 
of that assertion. (See Resp. Br., p.7.) Immediately after making that statement, post-
conviction counsel went on to clarify exactly what it was he was prepared to do: "I'm 
prepared to proceed. I've also gone through the original decision and have my own 
analysis of what it is I think we're supposed to do here today. My intention would be to 
put Mr. Olson on the stand and have him go through basically the original petition ... 
have him go through each one of the claims that he set forth." (Tr., Vol.4, p.11, 
Ls.19-24 (emphasis added).) Counsel's clarification reveals that he was not ready to 
effectively assist Mr. Olson in pursuing the unresolved claims. Rather, he was only 
prepared to let Mr. Olson attempt to justify his allegations to the district court. 
The State takes the same approach to another portion of counsel's statements 
trying to support its claim. (Resp. Br., p.7 (quoting Tr., Vol.4, p.13, Ls.10-13).) Yet 
again, the statement quoted by the State is taken out of context. It is immediately 
preceded by counsel's reassertion of his plans for the hearing and the request for 
additional time: 
[M]y understanding of how to prepare for today is that we go through and 
have Mr. Olson testify as to what kind of a basis he has for each one of 
those claims. And in that regard that's what I'm prepared to do today with 
regard to his testimony. Of course my client has indicated he'd like more 
6 
time to prepare, but I told -- I told the client that based upon my 
understanding of what the Court's instructions were today, if there is 
something that develops from this hearing in his testimony, and the 
State -- the Court is going to give the State additional time to brief it or 
submit additional evidence, we would ask for the same time to respond or 
present a response to that. But, in general, I think as far as I understood 
the Court's desire to move forward in terms of developing evidence today, 
I'm prepared to do that 
(Tr., Vol.4, p.12, L19 - p.13, L.13 (emphasis added).) Counsel clearly qualified his 
assertion that he was ready to proceed, asserting that all he was prepared to do was 
allow Mr. Olson the opportunity to try and explain his allegations. In counsel's mind, he 
had not been appointed to do more: "I feel like I'm kind of being bound here in the 
record into asserting things -- half the merit of my client [sic] -- when that's not what I've 
been directed to do." (See Tr., Vol.4, p.28, Ls.10-14.) A full examination of post-
conviction counsel's assertions demonstrates the error in the State's argument that he 
was ready to provide effective assistance to Mr. Olson. 
In fact, the transcript of the June 15, 2012, hearing reveals that post-conviction 
counsel did not fully understand Mr. Olson's remaining claims. (See Tr., Vol. 4, p.18, 
L.6 - p.28, L.21; compare, p.31, L.8 - p.94, L.22 (Mr. Olson's clarifications of his 
claims).) As such, he would not, at that point, be able to effectively assist Mr. Olson 
pursue relief for the alleged errors. Therefore, the State's assertion that post-conviction 
counsel was ready to proceed and was prepared to assist Mr. Olson in pursuing post-
conviction relief on those claims is meritless. 
As a result of counsel's underpreparedness, Mr. Olson was asking for additional 
time to prepare to adequately argue his remaining claims to the district court. 
(Tr., Vol.4, p.12, L.25 - p.13, L.9; Tr., Vol.4, p.14, Ls.14-24.) As demonstrated by the 
record, post-conviction counsel was not prepared to provide meaningful assistance in 
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that endeavor at the June 15, 2012, hearing. Therefore, the record clearly 
demonstrates that, by not granting the continuance and compelling Mr. Olson to attempt 
to avoid summary dismissal of his claims at the hearing on June 15, 2012, the district 
court deprived Mr. Olson of effective assistance of post-conviction counsel. See, e.g., 
Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 189 and 189 n.3 (Ct. App. 2008); Griffin v. State, 142 
Idaho 438, 441 (Ct. App. 2006). 
The State responds that, since Mr. Olson had more time to work with post-
conviction counsel than other petitioners who had been found to have sufficient time to 
prepare, he cannot make this argument on appeal. (Resp. Br., pp.5-6 (citing 
Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271, 277-78 (1945); January v. State, 127 Idaho 634, 638 
(Ct. App. 1995)). However, the mere fact that Mr. Olson had more time to try to prepare 
his case with counsel's help than the petitioners in January and Hawk does not mean 
that Mr. Olson or post-conviction counsel had sufficient time to prepare themselves. 
The specific facts of those two cases indicated that the petitioners had sufficient time to 
discuss the matters with counsel and prepare to proceed. Hawk, 326 U.S. at 278; 
January, 127 Idaho at 638. However, the application of the standards outlined in those 
cases to the specific facts of this case reveals that Mr. Olson did not have sufficient time 
to prepare, and thus, was forced to proceed without the effective assistance of counsel. 
(See App. Br., pp.12-14.) 
The record demonstrates that post-conviction counsel was not ready to proceed 
as an effective advocate for Mr. Olson's allegations. He was only ready to facilitate 
Mr. Olson's own attempts to explain his claims. Therefore, when the district court 
denied his request for a continuance, Mr. Olson was compelled to proceed without the 
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effective assistance of counsel in explaining and pursuing his claims for relief (at least 
one of which presented a genuine issue of material fact). (See App. Br., pp.8-19.) As 
such, this Court should remand this case so Mr. Olson can have sufficient time to 
discuss his claims with counsel. 
11. 
The District Court Erroneously Summarily Dismissed Mr. Olson's Petition For 
Post-Conviction Relief In The Face Of At Least One Genuine Issue Of Material Fact 
The State does not respond to Mr. Olson's argument that summary dismissal 
was inappropriate since he raised at least one genuine of material fact. Rather, it 
mistakenly contends that, simply because the hearing on June 15, 2012, was scheduled 
as an evidentiary hearing, that automatically means that it was an evidentiary hearing. 
First, the scheduling order does not identify that the hearing specifically as an 
evidentiary hearing. Second, the comments of the district court and counsel reveal that 
the June 15, 2012, hearing was only ever intended to be a hearing on summary 
dismissal. Additionally, the procedures employed at that hearing demonstrate that it 
was, in fact, a hearing on summary dismissal. The State's argument to the contrary 
only serves to improperly promote form over substance. 
Furthermore, if the State were correct, then the evidentiary hearing would have 
failed to comport with the requirements of procedural due process. Additionally, if the 
State were correct, then Mr. Olson would have been entitled to post-conviction relief, 
since the evidence he presented, which was uncontroverted, would have proved his 
allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. 
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1. The June 15, 2012, Hearing Was Not An Evidentiary Hearing 
The hearing was only scheduled as a hearing "for Post Conviction Relief." 
(R., Vol.2, pp.5, 12.) As such, the State's contention that "the district court 
unambiguously ordered an evidentiary hearing," is obviously mistaken. (See Resp. 
Br., p.10.) In fact, the district court's own assertions at the May 2, 2012, hearing belie 
that argument, revealing that the district court was not planning on having an evidentiary 
hearing on June 15, 2012: "And so I'm simply going to set it for hearing . . . . And then 
depending on the outcome of that and the court's ruling, we can reset it if the State 
chooses to present any evidence . . . in opposition to anything that comes up at the 
hearing." (Tr., Vol.3, p.1, L.19 - p.2, L.1 (emphasis added).) The assertion that the 
hearing would be reset if a presentation of evidence became necessary shows that the 
district court was only planning on making determinations based on summary dismissal 
standards at the June 15, 2012, hearing. 
The district court reaffirmed that perspective at the June 15, 2012, hearing. 
It asserted that the purpose of the June 15, 2012, hearing was only to clarify what 
issues remained to be resolved after the case had been remanded, not to hear 
evidence on those claims: "I want to go through what is going to be pursued by 
Mr. Olson today, and then what we're going to do is set this at a later date .... I want to 
know what's left to proceed on." (Tr., Vol.4, p.17, Ls.14-21.) In fact, during its initial 
recitation of the status of the case, the district court described the purpose of the June 
15, 2012, hearing: "if these claims survive this initial hearing date today, then certainly 
the State could bring any evidence in at a later point in time." (Tr., Vol.4. p.9, Ls.19-22.) 
These statements all reveal that the district court did not intend to hold, nor was it 
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holding, an evidentiary hearing on June 15, 2012. Rather, the point of that hearing was 
to decide what claims were still viable and which were subject to summary dismissal, 
and depending on the district court's decisions in that regard, an evidentiary hearing 
would subsequently be calendared. (See Tr., Vol.3, p.1, L.16 - p.2, L.1.) 
Furthermore, the district court was not even sure that it could properly continue 
presiding over this case at an evidentiary hearing: "what we're going to do is set this at 
a later date. It may not be before this Court, but I want to give -- and I'll see if I can 
continue to hear the post-conviction relief in this case -- but I want to know what's left to 
proceed on." (Tr., Vol.4, p.17, Ls.16-21 (emphasis added).) It seems illogical for the 
district court to question its ability to preside over an evidentiary hearing and yet, at the 
same time, hold that very hearing. As such, the State's contention that the hearing on 
June 15, 2012, was supposed to be an evidentiary hearing is clearly belied by the 
district court's assertions on the record. 
The State's contention - that the June 15, 2012, hearing constituted an 
evidentiary hearing since it was purportedly scheduled as an evidentiary hearing - is 
also erroneous because it promotes form over substance. See, e.g., Clark v. State, 92 
Idaho 827, 830 (1969) ("In considering an application for post-conviction relief, the court 
looks to the substance and disregards defects of form."). In fact, the Idaho Supreme 
Court has even determined that if the form of the hearing was improper, the substance 
of that hearing will dictate whether the result is appropriate or needs to be reversed. 
Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 777 (1986). Specifically, the Quick Court determined 
that, even though the district court erred by not holding the proper hearing, the 
substance of the jury's verdict controlled, which meant that no remand for the proper 
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hearing was necessary. Id. In so holding, the Idaho Supreme Court stated: "To 
remand for a new trial on such grounds would so elevate form over substance as to 
make a mockery of the jury's verdict." Id. The same rationale that the Court applied in 
Quick is applicable in this case: the substance of the district court's decisions in this 
case constituted summary dismissal. Affirming on the basis that the hearing was 
scheduled as an evidentiary hearing would only serve to impermissibly promote form 
over substance. Compare id. As such, the hearing should be evaluated on its 
substance. See id. 
Furthermore, the rules for summary dismissal proceedings provide that the 
petitioner have an opportunity to respond to the proposed summary dismissal. 
Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 322 (1995) (recognizing that, whether the 
district court files notice of intent to summarily dismiss or the State files a motion 
requesting summary dismissal, "the petitioner will have an opportunity to respond" to the 
proposed summary dismissal of his claims). Since the district court had essentially put 
Mr. Olson on notice for the potential of summary dismissal at the May 2, 2012, hearing 
(see Tr., Vol.3, p.1, L.16 - p.2, L.1), the June 15, 2012, hearing essentially functioned as 
Mr. Olson's opportunity to respond to the proposed summary dismissal of his claims. 
The fact that he responded by live testimony as opposed to written affidavit is of no 
consequence. 1 
Therefore, the nature of the June 15, 2012, hearing reveals that it was held for 
summary judgment purposes. And even if the nature of the hearing does not make its 
1 The only reason that Mr. Olson had to testify at all on June 15, 2012, is because, as 
discussed in detail in Section I, infra, his attorney was not prepared to proceed in regard 
to the remaining claims. (See App. Br., pp.8-14.) 
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purpose clear, there are several additional reasons why the State's contention that it 
was actually an evidentiary hearing is unreasonable. 
2. The June 15, 2012, Hearing Could Not Have Been An Evidentiary Hearing, 
Because, If It Were, Mr. Olson Would Not Have Been Afforded The Necessary 
Procedural Due Process Protections, Or, Alternatively, He Would Been Entitled 
To Post-Conviction Relief 
The State's contention that the June 15, 2012, hearing was an evidentiary 
hearing is also shown to be unreasonable because, if it were true, the necessary due 
process protections would not have been afforded to Mr. Olson. 
Procedural due process requires that "there must be some process to 
ensure that the individual is not arbitrarily deprived of his rights in violation 
of the state or federal constitutions. This requirement is met when the 
defendant is provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard." The 
opportunity to be heard must occur "at a meaningful time and in a 
meaningful manner" in order to satisfy the due process requirement. 
Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v. Piper, 133 Idaho 82, 91 (1999) (quoting 
State v. Rhoades, 121 Idaho 63, 72 (1991); Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 130 Idaho 
923, 927 (1998)); see also Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550-52 (1965). Since 
the district court asserted at the May 2, 2012, status hearing that its intent for the June 
15, 2012, hearing was to allow the defendant to overcome summary judgment, and if he 
was successful, the case would be set for an evidentiary hearing (see Tr., Vol.3, p.1, 
L.19 - p.2, L.1 ), allowing it to subsequently change the June 15, 2012, hearing into a 
full-fledged evidentiary hearing, as the State contends, would have deprived Mr. Olson 
of effective notice. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 
314 (1950); State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 542, 545-47 (Ct. App. 2009) (applying Mullane to 
find that the defendant had not been given notice of part of the purpose of the hearing). 
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Even assuming Mr. Olson would have been provided with sufficient notice, the 
procedures employed at that the June 15, 2012, hearing would have deprived Mr. Olson 
of a full, fair, and meaningful opportunity to argue his case if it were an evidentiary 
hearing. See Armstrong, 380 U.S. at 550-52; see also Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co., 
133 Idaho at 91; Castaneda, 130 Idaho at 927. The district court only heard Mr. Olson's 
testimony as to the basis for his allegations. (See generally, Tr., Vol.4; see, e.g., 
Tr., Vol.4, p.64, L.20 - p.67, L.2.) After he offered his explanation for each allegation, 
the district court ruled on that particular claim. It did not give him the opportunity after 
he had finished offering his testimony to offer additional evidence in support of his 
claims.2 Since he was not given the opportunity to present evidence besides his own 
testimony in support of his position (see generally Tr., Vol.4, pp.31-97), the hearing 
would not have been a full hearing, nor would it have provided Mr. Olson with a 
meaningful opportunity to argue his case. Since, if the June 15, 2012, hearing was an 
evidentiary hearing, it would have violated Mr. Olson's procedural due process rights, 
the only logical conclusion is that the June 15, 2012, hearing was not an evidentiary 
hearing. 
Along that same line of analysis, the State's assertion that this was an 
evidentiary hearing is unreasonable because, if it were true, then Mr. Olson would have 
2 Presumably, if Mr. Olson had been sufficiently put on notice that this was an 
evidentiary hearing, he would have objected to this procedure. However, as counsel 
asserted, he did not believe the hearing was to be an evidentiary hearing, and so had 
no reason to make such an objection. (See Tr., Vol.4, p.12, L.19 - p.13, L.13 ("[M]y 
understanding of how to prepare for today is that we go through and have Mr. Olson 
testify as to what kind of a basis he has for each one of those claims .... I think as far 
as I understood the Court's desire to move forward in terms of developing evidence 
today, I'm prepared to do that.").) As it is, this further demonstrates why, if this were an 
evidentiary hearing, Mr. Olson would not have received sufficient notice. 
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been entitled to post-conviction relief, since he would have proved his claims by a 
preponderance of the evidence. When a post-conviction claim goes to an evidentiary 
hearing, the petitioner has the burden to prove his claims by a preponderance of the 
evidence. See, e.g., Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 56 (2004); Cooke v. State, 149 
Idaho 233, 244 (Ct. App. 2010). The preponderance of the evidence standard means 
that the evidence, "when weighed with that opposed to it, has more convincing force 
and from which it results that the greater probability of truth lies therein." Big Butte 
Ranch, Inc. v. Grasmick, 91 Idaho 6, 9 n.2 (1966); see also Oxley v. Medicine Rock 
Specialties, Inc., 139 Idaho 476, 481 (2003) ("A preponderance of the evidence means 
that when weighing all of the evidence in the record, the evidence on which the finder of 
fact relies is more probably true than not."); In re Beyer,_ P.3d _, 2013 Opinion 
No.32, p.5 (Ct. App. 2013) ("A preponderance of the evidence means that the evidence 
shows something to be more probably true than not."). Mr. Olson offered unrefuted 
testimony in support of his claims for post-conviction relief. (See generally Tr., Vol.4, 
pp.31-97.) The State presented nothing to weigh against that evidence. Therefore, 
Mr. Olson contends that he would have met his burden of proof. 
For example, in regard to Issue B, Mr. Olson testified that his attorney promised 
that, if he pleaded guilty, he would be sentenced to a fixed term of two to three 
years, life indeterminate, to run concurrently with his other sentence. (Tr., Vol.4, p.39, 
L.21 - p.40, L.2.) The State offered no testimony to rebut that assertion. (See generally 
Tr., R.) Nor does, as the district court asserted, the guilty plea questionnaire contradict 
his claim. (See Tr., Vol.4, p.43, L.2 - p.44, L.3.) Rather, the questionnaire shows that 
Mr. Olson responded "yes," to the question about whether he had been promised a 
15 
sentence in exchange for his plea. (R., Vol.1, p.74.) The district court did not inquire 
about that response before accepting the guilty plea. (See generally Tr., Vol.6, pp.1-9.) 
As a result, the only explanations for that answer were Mr. Olson's comment on the 
questionnaire (that the State would not negotiate in that regard (R., Vol.1, p.74)), and 
his testimony at the June 15, 2012, hearing (that his attorney promised a particular 
sentence (Tr., Vol.4, p.39, L.19 - p.44, L.3)). That is the only evidence in the record on 
that issue. As such, the preponderance of the evidence presented in this case would 
make it more likely that Mr. Olson's trial attorney promised him the sentence he would 
receive, thereby invalidating the guilty plea. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 
137 (2009); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962); State v. Gomez, 
153 Idaho 253, 257 (2012); see also Wellnitz v. Page, 420 F.2d 935, 936 (10th Cir. 
1970). As such, if the State were correct and this was an evidentiary hearing, Mr. Olson 
would have been entitled to post-conviction relief. 
Because the only logical conclusion is that the June 15, 2012, hearing was held 
for summary judgment purposes, and because the district court erroneously summarily 
dismissed claims raising genuine issues of material fact, this case should be remanded 
for an actual evidentiary hearing on those claims. (See App. Br., pp.14-19.) 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Olson respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order 
summarily dismissing his claims for post-conviction relief and remand the case for an 
evidentiary hearing with the effective assistance of counsel. If this Court determines 
that the district court did hold an evidentiary hearing on June 15, 2012, Mr. Olson 
respectfully requests that it reverse the district court's decision because that hearing 
would have violated his procedural due process rights or because he would have 
proved his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. 
DATED this 3rd day of September, 2013. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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